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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

J E R R Y V. S T R A N D ,
Plaintiff-Appellee j
vs.
P R I N C E - C O V E Y & CO.,
INC., and A L M O N COVEY,
Defendant-A ppellant.

Case No.
13804

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JERRY V. STRAND

STATEMENT OF FACT
The plaintiff agrees with the defendant's statement
of fact except in one important particular.
The defendant claims that the plaintiff J E R R Y
S T R A N D filed no affidavit to support his purported
ownership of the stock or to support any other allegation in his complaint (see defendant's brief page 3).
The plaintiff's deposition was taken prior to hearing
1
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on the motion for Summary Judgment and at the hearing the defendants, themeslves, moved to publish that
deposition. The deposition, under oath, supports all
the allegations to plaintiff's complaint.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E R E IS NO I S S U E OF M A T E R I A L FACT
The defendants urge this court to reverse the lower
court by attempting to point out two "unresolved issues
of fact". In so doing, the defendants failed to consider a substantial portion of the record that was before the lower court and also this court. That part of
the record was plaintiff's deposition. Somehow, in preparing their brief, the defendants overlooked that it
moved for and was granted the publication of plaintiff's deposition (R-22). That deposition, under oath,
answers all of the "unresolved issues" that defendants
have raised.
The defendant in its brief states that the plaintiff
at no time averred under oath to support its proposition that he owned the stock in question (defendant's
brief, page 3). However, on page 6 and again on
pages 9 and 10 of plaintiff's deposition, he testified as
to his ownernship. In addition, the plaintiff's allegation of ownership was further supported by the defendant's own agent's affidavit.

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q. Now, you allege that in your complaint that
at least as of J a n u a r y 13, 1972 that you were the
owner of 6,000 shares of Hoffman Resources,
Inc., common stock; is that correct? 1
A . If that's the date in the complaint, yes.
don't recall right now.

I

Q. That's the date in the complaint.
A . All right.
Q. W h e n did you purchase these shares ?
A . I was constantly trading in the Hoffman
stock both as stock and as a riding option on
stock, so as to these specific shares it was—they
may well be acquired pursuant to an option or
they may have been purchased, but I specifically
don't remember right now what specific dates
they were acquired.
Q. W h e r e were you purchasing the stock ?
Through what broker?
A . Some of it were through individuals. Some
of it was through various brokers, both in this
city and other cities.
Q. D o you keep any records of these transaeaction ?
A . Yes, I do.
Q. D o you have those records in your possession?
A . I have them in my possession, yes. Either I
or E l m e r F o x has those records.
Q. E l m e r F o x being your accountant?
i The evidence before the trial court was that 4,000 shares of
stock and not 6,000 shares of stock were picked up on the
occasion which is the subject of this law suit.

3
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A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall the certificate numbers on these
6,000 shares?
A. I don't recall them but I do have a copy of
the receipt I think that was given to Ted England for the stock. (Plaintiff's deposition pages
6 and 7)
These averments were not denied under oath by defendants at the Summary Judgment hearing. In its
answer the defendants only denied plaintiff's ownership because of lack of information.
After Summary Judgment was granted, defendant's attorney filed an affidavit inferring circumstantially that plaintiff was not the owner of the stock
in question. The affidavit was not before the court at
the time of the hearing on the motion for Summary
Judgment and, therefore, was not properly considered
by the lower court. The affidavit was filed in support
of a motion to set aside the Judgment pursuant to
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
court denied the motion because the information had
always been in the defendant's attorney's knowledge
and could not be considered newly discovered evidence,
mistake, inadvertance, surprise, nor would it support
any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 60(b).
In the affidavit, defendant's attorney averred some
weeks before the alleged conversion that plaintiff testified in a Supplemental Proceeding that he did not own
any Hoffman stock. Even if the affidavit had been before the court on Summary Judgment, it would not
4
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have raised a genuine issue of material fact. The affidavit seeks to circumstantially infer that because some
weeks prior to the conversion plaintiff had testified he
did not own the stock. He, therefore, could not have
owned the stock at the time of conversion. The circumstantial inference was refuted by direct evidence by
both the plaintiff in his deposition and defendant's
agent in his affidavit. Even defendant's attorney averred that plaintiff had testified that he had options on
a considerable amount of Hoffman stock. Thus, the
affidavit would not raise a genuine issue of material
fact. Had defendants filed their affidavit before the
hearing, plaintiff could have easily answered, under
oath, how he exercised his options and acquired ownership to the stock between the time of the Supplemental
Hearing and the conversion.
The other supposed "unresolved issue of fact" is
the date upon which plaintiff discovered the conversion.
This would be material for the purposes of assessing
damages. However, on page 18 and again on page 21
of plaintiff's deposition, plaintiff testified concerning
the date that he discovered the conversion.
Q. Now, you've alleged in your complaint that
September 13, 1972 was the date at which the
conversion took place. Do you—were you aware
on September 13 that's when the conversion took
place?
A. Was I aware at the time, is that your question ?
Q. Right. On September 13, yeh.

5
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A. I was aware after—well, approximately that
time perhaps, within a day or two.
Q. In other words, around September 13, 14, or
15, you became aware that your stock had been
sold?
A. That's correct.
(Plaintiff's deposition page 18)
The unresolved issues of facts raised by defendant
in their brief were not unresolved and had the defendants read the entire record — including plaintiff's
deposition— they would have discovered the answers.

POINT II
P L A I N T I F F I S E N T I T L E D TO
J U D G M E N T AS M A T T E R OF L A W
A. The defendant was not a bona fide purchaser
of the stock in question.
B. Assuming defendant purchased plaintiffs stock
defendant could not have been a bona fide purchaser as:
1. Defendant's agent's knowledge of plaintiffs
ownership would be imputed by law to defendant.
2. Defendant's retention of the proceeds of the
converted property ratified their agent's
conversion.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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C. Assuming the knowledge of defendant's agent
will not be imputed to the defendant, plaintiff is
still entitled to Summary Judgment as knowledge is not an essential element of a conversion
action.
A. The defendant was not a bona fide purchaser
of the stock in question.
The defendants attempt to avoid liability by straining to argue that they did not convert plaintiff's securities but they purchased them; and that they were bona
fide purchasers. While plaintiff agrees with the defendant's statement of law concerning bona fide purchasers, the facts simply do not support the plaintiff's
claim.
The defendant's own statement of the facts are as
follows:
Mr. England agreed that if defendant would
pay Mr. England's debt to Murray First Thrift,
thereby obtaining release of the stock, Mr. England would sell the stock, repay the defendant
for the Murray First Thrift payment and use
the balance of the proceeds to pay or reduce his
debt (R-20) (defendant's brief pages 2 and 3).
Mr. Covey accompanied Mr. England to Murray First Thrift where Mr. Covey delivered defendant's check to pay the loan and Murray
First Thrift released and delivered to Mr. England certificates representing at least 4,000
shares of Hoffman Resources stock . . . Mr.
Covey and Mr. England returned to Prince
Covey & Co. offices where 4,000 shares of the
stock were deposited in England's personal ac-

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

count and sold. Proceeds were given to defendant Prince-Covey & Co. to repay it for the money
advanced to Murray First Thrift and to pay or
reduce England's debt to defendant (R-20) (defendant's brief page 3).
Under no strain of interpretation did those facts amount
to a purchase of the shares by Prince-Covey & Co.
The shares were merely sold by Prince-Covey & Co.
B. Assuming defendants purchased
plaintiffs
stock it could not have been a bona fide purchaser as:
1. Defendant's agent's knowledge of plaintiffs
ownership would be imputed by law to defendant
2. Defendant's retention of the proceeds of
the converted property ratified their agent's
conversion.
The defendant again attempts a strained interpretation of the facts to support its argument that the
knowledge of its agent would not be imputed to it.
Again, the plaintiff does not quarrel with the well
established rule that the knowledge of the agent will
not be imputed to the principal in transactions where
in the parties were acting adversly. However, the facts
simply do not support such a proposition. The defendant and its agent were acting jointly for their mutual
benefit. The defendant issued its check to obtain securities that were pledged at a lending institution. The
defendant and the agent received the stock together

8
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and transported the same to the offices of defendant.
There the stock was deposited in an account at defendant's offices. From there, through the use of defendants facilities as a brokerage firm, the stock was
sold. The proceeds came from the buying broker to
defendant and it retained a portion of the proceeds to
satisfy its position and paid the balance to its agent
(see defendant's own statement of facts on pages 2
and 3 of its brief).
This is not a case where the defendant purchased
stock from its agent but rather where the two of them
together sold stock through the defendant's facilities
and divided the proceeds. It can hardly be said that
the agent and the principal's interest were adverse —
they were the same.
The fact that England may have had a personal
interest did not prevent the defendant from being on
notice as to plaintiff's interest in the stock converted.
The Restatement of Agency 2d, Section 271 states:
A notification by or to a third person to or by
an agent is not prevented from being notice to
or by the principal because of the fact that the
agent, when receiving or giving the notification,
is acting adversely to the principal, unless the
third person has notice of the agent's adverse
purposes.
Consequently, to the extent that England was acting
on his own behalf as well as for the incidental benefit
of the defendants, the defendants are liable for his conversion. Section 274 of the Restatement of Agency 2d,
states

9
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The knowledge of an agent who acquires property for his principal affects the interest of his
principal in the subject matter to the same extent as if the principal had acquired it with the
same knowledge, except where the agent is privileged not to disclose or to act upon the knowledge, or a change in conditions makes it inequitable thus to affect the principal.
Further, subsection c. of the Comment of Section 274
states:
Where an agent, having no power to bind the
principal by the transaction, acquires property
from a third person by fraud and, without the
principal's knowledge transfers it to the principal
to make up for past or future embezzlements, the
principal takes it subject to a constructive
trust,...
Section 282 of the Restatement of Agency 2d provides:
(1) A principal is not affected by the knowledge of an agent in a transaction in which the
agent secretly is acting adversely to the principal
and entirely for his own or another's purposes
except as stated in Subsection (2).
(2) The principal is affected by the knowledge
of an agent who acts adversely to the principal:
(a) if the failure of the agent to act upon or
to reveal the information results in a violation
of a contractual or relational duty of the principal to a person harmed thereby; . . .
(c) if, before he has changed, his position the
principal knowingly retains a benefit through the
act of the agent which otherwise he would not
have received. (Emphasis added.)

10
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Comment c. to Section 282 of the Restatement
ency 2d states :

of Ag-

c. Meaning of 'acting adversely/ The mere fact
that the agent's primary interests are not coincident with those of the principal does not prevent
the latter from being affected by the knowledge
of the agent if the agent is acting for the principal's interests. The rule as stated herein is substantially similar to the rule stated in Sections
235-236, dealing with the liability of a principal
or master for the torts of his agent, and the
Comment on those Section is applicable.
Section 235 of the Restatement of Agency 2d, Comment b. on mixed motives states:
b. Mixed motives. The servant may be within
the scope of employment, although his departure
from instructions in the performance of his work
is for his own purposes, if his act is done with
the intent to serve his employer. In such case,
the rule stated in Section 236 applies.
Section 236 of the Restatement of Agency 2d provides:
Conduct may be within the scope of employment, although done in part to serve the purposes of the servant or of a third person.
In Barsh v. Mullins, 338 P.2d 845 (Okla. 1959) the
court held that where a glass manufacturer accepted
the benefit of an arrangement between one of its employees and a third party for the transportation of its
wares in the course of his employment and in the performance of a duty that it had given him the authority to perform, the company was in no position to deny

11
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knowledge of the arrangement. The court relied upon
Section 282 of the Restatement of Agency 2d.
I n Reynolds v. Snow, 197 N Y S 2d 590 aff'd 168
N E 2d 882 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) the court held that
under the provisions of Section 282 of the Restatement
of Agency 2d where a husband acquired stock in violation of a third party's rights in the name of his wife
that the knowledge would be imputed to the wife and
that the third party could recover.
In 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency, Section 270, the general
rule is acknowledged that a principal is liable for the
contracts of his agent where the third person had no
knowledge of the agent's dereliction. In the instant
case, the action can be one in conversion or the violation of the contractual relationship (by conversion) between the plaintiff and defendant's agent.
In 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 261 Agency, it is recognized that a principal is liable for the acts of his agent
within his scope of employment or apparent authority
which the principal ratifies with knowledge of the facts
surrounding the circumstances. In the instant case, the
actions of England were for the direct benefit of the
defendants' interests and in satisfaction of their accounts and the evidence presented to the court upon
which the original judgment was based disclosed knowledge on the part of England and the defendants as to
the impropriety of using the stock in question to satisfy
England's accounts. Further, the defendants have retained the benefits of the conversion in effect ratifying
12
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the acts of England's conversion. When a principal has
knowledge of acts of his agent which were contrary to
law, he has a duty to disaffirm those actions at the
first reasonable moment. If there is any action on the
part of the principal that indicates his intention to become a party to the transaction it constitutes ratificaion. Moses v. Archie McFarland <§ Son, 119 Utah 602
P.2d 531 (1951). The Utah court in Thirteenth and
Washington Street Corp. v. Nelsen, 123 Utah 70, 254
P.2d 847 (1953) recognized that where a landlord authorizes the conduct of another which amounts to tortious
conduct, he must bear the responsibility of the conduct.
In Malta State Bank Commissioner v. Giles, 100
Utah 562, 114 P.2d 208 (1941), the Utah court was
concerned with a situation where the pledgee of stock
received certificates belonging to the wife of a pledgor.
The court held under the circumstances of that case
that the pledgee was placed on notice as to the limitation of the apparent authority of the agent. The facts
of that particular case allow a justifiable inference
that in this case the defendants should have been on
reasonable notice that the stock England converted and
used for their benefit was not free from suspicion. In
the instant case, the plaintiff acted in good faith and
with innocence of fradulent actions of England and the
defendants retained the benefits of their agent's action.
Under such circumstances, the acceptance of the benefit constituted a ratification and estops the defendants
from disclaiming liability for conversion. Latsis v. Nick
Floor, 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (1940). In the last
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cited case the court held that where benefits of illegal
action of an agent are retained by the principal that
they become liable to an innocent third party as if an
agent had acted properly.
A case very similar in legal substance to that of
the instant action is Allred v. Hinckley, 8 Utah 2d 73,
328 P.2d 726 (1958). I n this action a seed grower
was the plaintiff against a seed buyer and its agent.
The seed buyer's agent falsely represented that the seed
had been purchased from the growers and the agent's
principal, the defendant, had converted such seed to its
own use. The court held the defendants liable under
a theory of conversion stating:
W e consider the second question first: The Company is clearly liable for the full value of the
seed which Malin sold to it without authority to
do so from the grower. For by taking possession of such seed upon delivery from Malin who
had no right to make such sale or delivery, the
Company converted such seed to its own use. By
such conversion the Company became liable to
the grower for the full value of such seed less
the amount which the grower received from it as
advancement.
A conversion is an act of willful interference
with a chattel, done without lawful justification
by which the person entitled thereto is deprived
of its use and possession. The measure of damages of conversion is the full value of the property. I t requires such a serious interference with
the owner's right that the person interfering
therewith may reasonably be required to buy the
goods. Although conversion results only from
14
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intentional conduct it does not however require
a conscious wrongdoing, but only an intent to
exercise dominion or control over the goods inconsistent with the owner's right. A purchaser
of stolen goods or an auctioneer who sells them
in good faith becomes a converter since his acts
are an interference with the control of the property or in other words, a claiming of the ownership in such property and taking it out of the
possession of someone else with intention of exercising dominion over it is a conversion. Thus
a bona fide purchaser of goods for value from
one who has no right to sell them becomes a converter when he takes possession of such goods.
Under the theory of the above recited cases of the
Utah Supreme Court, it is apparent that the defendants were liable for the conversion of plaintiff's stock,
and that as a matter of law they have no defense based
upon the position of their agent or the fact that his
knowledge may have been adverse to the plaintiff since
the acts were definitely beneficial to the defendants and
the defendants retained the benefits of the conversion.
C. Assuming the knowledge of the defendant's
agent will not be imputed to the defendant,
plaintiff is still entitled to Summary
Judgment as knowledge is not an essential element
of a conversion action.
Even assuming the defendant and its agent were
acting adversely so that the agent's knowledge of plaintiff's ownership could not be imputed to defendant,
such knowledge is irrelevant. The law is clear that a
conversion action will lie whether or not the defendant
15
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knows that the property he converts belongs to plaintiff. 18 Am. Jur. 2nd Section 7 Conversion 162 states:
Generally, the motive the defendant acts with is
immaterial in an action for conversion. Liability
for a conversion is not necessarily precluded by
the fact the defendant acts . . . sincerely, innocently . . . or in ignorance of the plaintiff's interest in the properties . . . An action for conversion does not rest on the knowledge or intent
of the defendant.
The present case is controlled by the above-stated
general rule which has been followed consistently by
the Utah Supreme Court. In the case closely in point,
Alfred v, Hinkley, supra, Utah Supreme Court stated:
Although conversion results from intentional
conduct it does not however require a conscious
wrong doing but only an intent to exercise dominion or control over the goods in-consistant
with the owners right.
In the present case, the defendant Prince-Covey
& Co. exercised dominion and control over the plaintiff's securities and interferred with his right therein
so that the defendant is liable regardless of whether or
not it knew that the securities were owned by plaintiff.
D . Value is not an issue.
The general rule is that plaintiff, upon conversion
of his securities, is entitled to the value thereof within
a reasonable time after his notice of the conversion.
The Western Securities Company v. Silver King Consolidated Mining Company of Utah, 57 Utah 88 192
16
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Pac. 664, 672 (1920). The affidavit of Mack E . MeBride which was not controverted by the defendant
established a price within two weeks of plaintiff's
knowledge of the conversion. The court was proper
in holding that two weeks was a reasonable time.
The defendants attempt to argue that the Judgment should not have been granted or once granted
should have been set aside because plaintiff was incorrect about the date of the conversion. However, the
date of the conversion is immaterial. I t is the date
plaintiff receives notice of the conversion that is important. Western Securities Co. v. Stiver King Consolidated Mining Company of Utah, supra. The uncontradicted evidence is that plaintiff learned of the
conversion on September 13th, 14th, or 15th (see deposition page 18). The date of conversion whether in
August or September is unimportant.

POINT III
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D NOT E R R I N
D E N Y I N G D E F E N D A N T S M O T I O N TO S E T
ASIDE J U D G M E N T AND FOR R E H E A R I N G
The defendants sought relief from the court's
judgment heretofore entered by invoking the provision
of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The motion to set aside the judgment and for rehearing does not specify what portion of Rule 60(b). Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants contend justifies the court in relieving the defendants from the
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judgment currently against them. In their brief, defendants' specify Rule 60(b)(7). Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. provides:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons (1) mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b) ; (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an
action has not been personally served upon the
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5)
the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time
and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken . . .
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
patterned after Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and therefore decisions of courts and
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authorities treating the Federal rule are useful in determining whether defendants are entitled to any relief.
The motion of defendants supported by an affidavit from Almon Covey concerning Ted England's
duties and responsibilities relates to the scope of his
authority. As noted heretofore where an agent converts property of a third person and turns it over to
his principal for their mutual benefit, the conversion is
complete and if the fruits of the conversion are retained, there is no question as to scope of authority.
Further, nothing is set out in the affidavit of Almon
Covey which is either newly discovered or was not
known at the time of the original action. Second, the
contention that there is no proof of ownership is not
supported by the record. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he owned the stock (plaintiff's deposition
pages 6, 9, and 10). That deposition was published at
the hearing for Summary Judgment (R-22). The affidavit of Ted England, the person who converted the
plaintiff's stock and who was defendant's agent, avers
plaintiff's ownership. Further, the affidavit of Ted
England asserts the belief that Almon Covey also knew
of the fact that plaintiff owned the stock in question.
Nothing is added in any of the affidavits of any of the
parties that was not known or could not have been ascertained at the time of the original hearing. The affidavits would appear to raise ethereal contentions lacking any substance when analyzed against the issues
raised in the complaint and the matters considered at
the time the court granted Summary Judgment. Fur-
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ther, the new contentions made with reference to the
date of conversion were equally capable of discovery
and subject to presentment to the court at the time of
the motion for Summary Judgment.
In Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v Shaw,
273 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1959), the court denied relief
under Rule 60(b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
where there was a question of ownership of a chattel involved in the litigation. The court concluded that the
evidence of ownership of the trailer could readily have
been discovered before trial. To the extent that there
is any substance to defendants' contentions with reference to the ownership of the stock, a position plaintiff
contends is specious, the fact could have been determined within the time for presentation of the motion
for Summary Judgment and therefore relief under
Rule 60 (b) is not available.
In Flett v. W. ui. Alexander and Co., 302 F.2d
321 (7th Cir. 1962) cert. den. 371 U.S. 841 (1962),
the court denied relief under Rule 60(b) because there
was no adequate showing that the newly discovered
evidence could not have been discovered by the exercise
of due diligence. Moore, supra. Para. 60.234 notes:
The evidence must be such as was not and could
not by the exercise of diligence have been discovered in time to present in the original proceeding.
I n DiSilvestro v. U.S. Veterans
Administration,
9 F D R 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) the court denied relief
under Rule 60(b) (2) where the evidence in question
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was within the moving parties knowledge at the time
of the original proceedings. In the instant case, it is
apparent that the contentions which defendants advance
in support of their motion for relief from judgment
were well within their knowledge or ability to ascertain
prior to the time this court originally rendered judgment.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Valmont
Industries, Inc. v. Enresco, Inc., 446 F.2d 1193 (10th
Cir. 1971 ) upheld a denial of relief on the grounds that
a party did not use diligence when he failed to locate
foreign patents before judgment. The patents were
located in the patent office in two places and plaintiff
did not search one place, did search the other place, but
failed to find the subject matter. In Caribou Four
Corner's Inc. v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 443 F.2d
796 (10th Cir. 1971), the court upheld the denial of
relief from a judgment on the grounds of newly discovered evidence when the alleged mistake by the party
was that he had given the wrong insurance policy to
opposing counsel and to the court when he had the new
policy in his files all the time. In United States v.
Aerodex, Inc., 327 F . Supp. 1027 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
the court denied a motion for relief from judgment
where the defendants knew of the testimony of witnesses who did not testify. The above federal cases
clearly support the contention of plaintiff that defendants' motion should be denied.
A similar position was taken in Warren v. Dixon
Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). In
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that case, the Utah court noted with reference to the
status of a person seeking relief from a default judgment: "however, the movant must show that he has
used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control."
I n McWhirter v. Donaldson, 36 Utah 293, 104 Pac.
731 (1909) the court refused to grant relief from a
judgment under statutory provisions comparable to
Rule 60 (b) (Revised Statutes of Utah 1898 Sec. 3005).
The court stated:
". . . a party . . . must show that he has used
due diligence to prepare and present his defense,
and that he was either prevented from doing so
because of some accident, misfortune, or circumstance over which he has no control; or that he
has been misled or lulled into an action by some
agreement or act of the opposite party or his
counsel upon which he had a right to rely. This
appellant has wholly failed to do (Peterson v.
Crosier, 29 Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860)."
A similar position was reached by the Utah Supreme
Court in Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 303 P.2d
995 (1956). Although the Utah court has recognized
that the trial court in making a determination to set
aside a judgment has substantial discretion, Cutler v.
Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 99 Pac. 897 (1907), relief is
not automatic and must be based upon a justifiable
basis under the rules. Salt Lake Hardware Co. v.
Neilson Land and Water Co., 43 Utah 406, 134 Pac.
911 (1913).
The case of Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375
P.2d 28 (1962) appears to be applicable to the instant
22
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motion of defendants. In that case, the Utah court
held the trial court had abused its discretion in granting relief. The court observed:
W e are in accord with the proposition urged by
the defendant that the trial court has broad discretion in granting new trials; and in allowing
relief under Rule 60(b). But its power is not
without limitation and cannot be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily. I t is elementary that
under usual circumstances the regular rules of
procedure are binding, and that a party who has
allowed the time to move for a new trial to expire
is thereafter precluded from doing so. This can
be avoided only where it is made to appear that
for one or more of the reasons specified in Rule
60(b) justice has been so thwarted that equity
and good conscious demand that this extraordinary relief be granted. And the burden of showing facts to justify doing so is upon him who
seeks such relief.
In order to warrant the granting of a new trial
on the ground of belatedly discovered evidence,
relied on by the plaintiffs, it would have to appear both that it 'by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial';
and that such evidence was of sufficient substance that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a different result. Otherwise, it is obvious that the ends of justice would not be served
by ordering a new trial.
Sparing the detail of plaintiffs' affidavits, it is
sufficient to say that any evidence referred to
therein having any probative value on the disputed issues appears to be so meager that we
cannot believe there is any likelihood that it
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would produce a different result. But more significant, and of controlling importance, is the
fact that no reason whatsoever is given to show
why such evidence could not have been discovered
in time to move for a new trial, nor in fact to
have been presented on the original trial. Therefore, there existed no proper bases for granting
relief under Rule 60(b).
No reason is given why the arguments now addressed to the court could not have been earlier presented. Under Rule 60 (b) U.R.C.P., relief is not available from error resulting from mere carelessness. 7
Moore's Federal Practice, page 254. In Kahle v. Amtorg Trading Corporation, 13 F R D 170 (D.C.N.J.
1952), relief was sought from a Summary Judgment.
The motion for the relief was predicted under Rule
60(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
affidavit in support of relief from the judgment indicated that additional correspondence was available
which at the time counsel thought was of no importance or relevance. There was no indication that the
evidence was not available prior to Summary Judgment. The motion to set aside the judgment was
denied. The court observed:
It seems obvious from the affidavit that the mistake, if any, was that of plaintiffs, who admittedly delivered only part of their file to the attorney
who then represented them; the affiant admits
that he withdrew from the file and delivered to
the attorney only the documentary evidence
which he 'believed to be pertinent to the claim.'
The plaintiffs may not have been aware of the
'importance or relevance' of the documentary
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evidence which they now offer, but this did not
relieve them of the duty to make full disclosure
to their attorney, who was competent to appraise
the evidence. The course which they pursued
was improvident but it was nevertheless intentional.
. . . It is our opinion that under the circumstances the plaintiffs may not be relieved of an
adverse judgment on their representation that
they are in possession of additional evidence
which they thought 'was of no importance or
relevance' when the motion was argued. If summary judgments are vacated on such tenuous
grounds they will lack finality and the very purpose of Rule 56 . . . will be defeated. There will
be no end to litigation.
The plaintiffs would not be entitled to prevail
if the present motion were predicted on the
grounds defined in subdivision (b) (2) of the
Rule, (citing cases) The conditions prescribed
by this subdivision are not present in the instant case. May the plaintiffs unable to meet
the requirements of subdivision ( b ) ( 2 ) , avoid
them by an expedient resort to the grounds
enumerated in subdivision (b) (1)? It is our
opinion that the answer must be in the negative,
especially where, as here, the mistake was a mistake of judgment ascribed solely to the plaintiffs . . .
This is not a case in which a litigant failed to
defend because of 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect', the case in which
subdivision (b) (1) is usually invoked . . . The
plaintiffs were accorded a hearing on the motion
and were afforded a full opportunity to present
the evidence in their possession, including the
evidence upon which the present motion rests.
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Moore ,supra, page 257 notes:
Parties desiring such relief must particularlize,
and do not acquit themselves of responsibility by
showing merely that they placed the case in the
hands of an attorney.
Where a party who makes an informed choice as
to a particular course of action seeks relief, the mere
fact that the choice was unfortunate is not a basis for
relief from judgment. See Samson v. Radio Corporation of America, 434 F.2d 315 (2nd Cir 1970). The
decisions from the Utah Supreme Court are of a similar nature. In Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293,
373 P.2d 573 (1962), then District Judge Ellett refused relief under Rule 60(b) from a judgment on
the grounds of inadvertence and excusable neglect. The
Supreme Court affirmed finding that where defendant
had notice of the action and the intention of the opposing counsel to act in a particular fashion and failed
to act to protect his client's interests that relief from
a default judgment would not be granted. In Ledwith
v. Storkan, 2 F E D 530 (1942), it was observed:
It is manifest that facts here do not involve
either mistake or surprise. If relief may be
granted at all it must rest either upon 'inadvertence' or 'excusable neglect.'
I t may be added that while inadvertence and
neglect are not precisely identical in their connotations they are often classified as synonymous
. . . And finally, though in the rule, and in the
statutes underlying it, the word 'excusable' does
not precede the word inadvertence unless it is
actually excusable.
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Precisely what circumstances will avail to render
the neglect of counsel excusable may not be adequately set down. But some measure of excusability may be gotten from decision where relief
has been granted. They include (a) continuous
preoccupation with the trial of a distracting first
degree murder case, (b) reliance on assurance
by the Court or a clerk thereof or opposing
counsel as to the time of trial, (c) Failure to
reach the place of trial in consequence of casual
ties in traffic (d) sudden illness of counsel, (e)
unanticipated summons to the bedside of a dying
relative, and other like incidents. In each instance there was inadvertence or neglect which
intercepted the timely performance of a required
act, but there was likewise some disturbing and
distracting events which rendered the error excusable.
Inevitable, the argument of the defendant must
proceed to the point where they assert, that having employed counsel for the protection of their
interests, they did all that could be expected of
them and are entitled to absolution from responsibility for their attorney's negligence. But
that seems not to be a tenable position, for by
the weight of authority the negligence of counsel in this behalf is imputed to his client.
A similar result was reached in Peterson v. Crosier, 29
Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860 (1905) and Salt Lake Hardware Company v. Neilson Land and Water Co., Supra.
See also Restatement of Judgments, Section 126(e)
and (f) and Example 7 on page 617. In Warren v.
Dixon Ranch Co., supra, the Utah court cited Section
126 of the Restatement of Judgment with approval.
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In Board of Education v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385,
384 P.2d 806 (1963), the Utah court refused to set
aside a judgment under Rule 60(b) where the reason
for the neglect was a complaint on the merits and
where the defendants asserted the reason for failing to
answer was that they thought the summons was invalid.
The motion and accompanying papers submitted
by defendants does not justify relief under the broad
provisions of 60(b) (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That provision is identical with 60(b) (6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In commenting
on its application in Summary Judgment situations,
Professor Moore notes, 7 Moore's Federal Practice,
page 362:
The principles governing judgments entered
after a trial generally should govern summary
judgments, as the latter are dispositions on the
merits in which the attack is normally upon the
substantive correctness of the decision. Judgments disposing of a case without consideration
of the merits (default judgments, voluntary dismissals, and dismisals for failure to observe the
Rules and others of the court) present somewhat
different considerations, for they must be considered against a background of general preference for disposition of cases on their substantive
merits.
In the instant case, the summary judgment process
afforded the defendants every opportunity to present
the merits of their case. They cannot now be heard
to seek relief after the fact. Further, it is well settled
that relief under a general clause of Rule 60(b) must
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be on a basis other than would justify relief on any of
the other specifically stated subsection. In 7 Moore's
Federal Practice, page 343, it is observed:
I t is important to note, however, that clause (6)
contains two very important internal qualifications to its application: first, the motion must be
based upon some reason other than those stated
in clauses ( l ) - ( 5 ) ; and second, the other reason
urged for relief must be such as to justify relief.
See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
No articulation of any basis that would justify relief
other than those set out in the particularized clauses is
contained in defendants' motion. The clause is not a
substitute for appeal, 7 Moore, supra, page 348, and
courts require "exceptional and compelling circumstances" before a party will be granted relief from a
judgment under the general clause. Moore, supra, page
348. I t is submitted that in the absence of some more
precise articulate reason to justify relief that the defendans have not stated any basis why a motion should
be granted relieving them from the judgment heretofore entered.
As noted in other parts of this brief, there is no
such thing as a general motion for reconsideration
under Utah law. See also Drury v. Lunleeford, 8
Utah 2d 74, 515 P.2d 662 (1966). The defendants
have filed their motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule provides only a
very limited base for relief. It does not justify relief
on a basis that could have been originally urged at the
time of consideration of the matter which led to judg-
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ment. Procedurally it is a narrow remedy. I t is not a
basis for re-argument of matters previously considered
or for consideration of evidence that otherwise could
have been presented. Considering the application of
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure within the
parameters of its limited application and the insipid
basis urged by defendants for relief from the judgment,
it is apparent that defendants have not made out a
basis for relief under any of the subsection of Rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion of the defendants was properly denied.
P O I N T IV

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD
NOT ORDER A SET-OFF
For the first time in its brief on appeal the defendant urges that the Utah Supreme Court should
order a set-off. The defendants did not allege a setoff in their answer; and as pointed out by the defendants, intervening liens may have attached to the judgment. These matters should be resolved in the lower
courts in the proper manner and not decided on a basis
of first impression on an incomplete record in the Utah
Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
There is no genuine issue of a material fact — all
of the "unresolved questions of fact" that defendants
attempt to raise are answered in that portion of the
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record which contains plaintiff's deposition and which
somehow was overlooked by the defendants.
As a matter of law the plaintiff is entitled to recovery for conversion as the defendant was not a purchaser of the stock however, assuming that it was, it
could not be a bona fide purchaser as the knowledge of
its agent concerning plaintiff's ownership would be
imputed to the defendant and the defendant's retention
of the proceeds of the conversion ratified the conversion of its agent; further, knowledge of plaintiff's ownership is unimportant in a conversion action.
The judgment should not have been set aside by
the lower court as the defendants have raised nothing
new that they could not have raised by exercising reasonable diligence and the grounds under which the defendants seek relief are not supported by Rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Utah Supreme Court should not order a setoff as the same was not pleaded by the defendants; the
lower court has not had a chance to rule yet on the
priorities of liens that may have attached to the judgment and there is no record upon which the Utah
Supreme Court could base a decision.
Respectfully submitted,
R I C H A R D J. L E E D Y
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
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